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QF ALL THE two-faced problems in the law, there is none more
tormenting than the admissibility of illegally obtained evidence.
Whichever face one turns to the wall, the question of admissibility
remains a haunting one. The evidence may be of the greatest relevance. If its admission serves to condone lawless law enforcement,
however, it opens the way to government intrusion on the privacy of
law-abiding people. The dilemma has long troubled lawyers, though
it is ironically remote from those ignorant of the long reach of official
power and hence most vulnerable to it. Their preoccupation is with
the immediate threat of private lawlessness, particularly so in our time
when it grows apace. The understandably impatient law-abiders, who
approve official retribution without restraint against wrongdoers, do not
visualize themselves as the objects of oppressive government action in
any near future. Not for them are the warnings of history.
The Supreme Court of the United States has been consistently
mindful of the long-range dangers of police lawlessness in searches and
seizures since its definitive adoption in 1914 of the rule excluding evidence therefrom in federal courts.' Though there has not been like
consistency in the judicial articulation of what constitutes such lawlessness, able critiques of the now abundant cases are at the service of the
courts for constructive development of rules at once flexible and consistent. 2 The 1961 decision in Mapp v. Ohios extending the exduf Delivered as an address at Duke University School of Law, March 1962.
* Associate Justice, Supreme Court of California.
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (19-4).
2 See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 167-226 (1959); Allen, Federalism and The
Fourth Amendment: A Requiem For Wolf, 596! Sup. Cr. REV. z; Barrett, Persoff4
Rights, Property Rights, and The Fourth Amendment, 196o SUP. Cr. REV. 46; Broeder,
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sionary rule to state courts affords a starting point for active and intelligent cooperation between federal and state courts. The unresolved
questions that attend the exclusionary rule can serve as catalysts of law
that could foster harmonious relations among federal and state governments in their common responsibility of balancing individual freedom
against governmental regulation and restraint.
It bears emphasis at the outset that the exclusionary rule now to
be uniformly observed in state courts is not implemented with specifications such as attend a Uniform Act. There is no mandate in the Mapp
opinion that as the states henceforth abide by the exclusionary rule,
they must also abide by its various interpretations in the federal courts,
interpretations freighted with orthodox property and tort concepts.
There is no identification of who has standing to invoke the rule. There
are no directives for or against retroactivity.
There is no bill of particulars as to what constitutes lawful arrest
or reasonable search incident to lawful arrest. Silence rings the large
question of permissible investigation before arrest. Silence rings the
large question of how much sweep there can be to a search. We will
have to find out what constitutes probable cause for arrest and probable
cause for a warrant. We will have to find out what it is that makes a
search or seizure unreasonable. And now that the erstwhile rule of
evidence is transfigured as constitutional doctrine, now that it has
emerged from the wings to the mise en scene of the fourth amendment,
what will become of its unsettled relations with the fifth amendment,
which has not yet so boldly advanced as the fourth from the wings of
the fourteenth amendment? To call but a partial roll of the myriad
questions is to seize how spare is the rule of Mapp and to understand
how wide must be our search for the dues to its orderly evolution. We
will come upon enduring answers only if we first come to some understanding of the nature and scope of the right to privacy that the fourth
amendment protects.
Such understanding will take time, but it is not impossible to achieve.
The Decline and Fall of Wolf v. Colorado, 40 NEB. L. REV. 185 (1961); Grant, The
Tarnished Silver Platter: Federalism and Admissibility of Illegally Seized Evidence, 8
U.C.L.A.L. REV. i (i96:); Kamisar, Wolf and Lustig Ten Years Later: Illegal State
Evidence in State and Federal Courts, 43 MINN. L. REV. 1083 (x9s). This illustrative list may indicate to the interested how rich a literature awaits them. Among the
most recent additions is a comprehensive and illuminating comment, Search and Seizure
in The Supreme -Court:Shadows on The Fourth Amendment, a8 U. CH. L. REV. 664
(3.96S).
a367 U.S. 6643.'(i96).
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At least the unresolved problems about the borderline between lawful
and unlawful police conduct in search and seizure are now out in the
open. Some have criticized the exclusionary rule as if it had engendered the problems. In fact it has tardily excavated them from the
oubliettes where lie the stifled problems of the law. So long as illegally
obtained evidence remained admissible in many states there was little
motivation for full-scale inquiry. The exclusionary rule of Mapp provides that motivation, even though it cannot of itself work any immediate transformation in the neglected congeries of inchoate concepts
regarding the legality of police conduct.
As some twenty-five states now make up for lost time and begin
their education in the biokinetics of law enforcement agencies, it may
be useful to bear witness to my own education regarding such problems.
In 1942 1 wrote an opinion rejecting the exclusionary rule4 and in 1955
the opinion that established it in California.5 The education that leads
a judge to overrule himself and his subsequent education in developing
the new rule may serve as a relevant introduction to the responsibilities
now incumbent upon all state courts in sequence of Mapp v. Ohio.
In 1942 dear academic postulates were as yet unclouded by long
judicial experience. Fugitive misgivings about admitting illegally obtained evidence gave way to the overwhelming relevance of the evidence. True, one was not insensitive to the forward-looking logic that
envisaged a guilty defendant as a prototype victim of unlawful police
intrusion. Still I was able to decide, though in decidedly negative
tenor, that:
It does not necessarily follow, however, that the use in a court of law of
evidence thus obtained is so contrary to fundamental principles of liberty and
justice as to constitute a denial of due process of law. A criminal trial does
not constitute a denial of due process so long as it is fair and impartial....
The fact that an officer acted improperly in obtaining evidence presented at
the trial in no way precludes the court from rendering a fair and impartial
judgment.'
If that was hardly a ringing endorsement of illegally obtained evidence,
it was all that was needed as a ticket of admission.
My misgivings about its admissibility grew as I observed that time
after time it was being offered and admitted as a routine procedure.
'People v. Gonzales, 2o Cal. 2d 165, 124 P.2d 44 (1942).
*People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. zd 434, 282 P.zd 905 (x955).
P.2d 44,47 (1942).'
'People v. Gonzales, 2o Cal. 2d 165, 170, zx,114
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It became impossible to ignore the corollary that illegal searches and
seizures were also a routine procedure subject to no effective deterrent;
else how could illegally obtained evidence come into court with such
regularity? It was one thing to condone an occasional constable's blunder, to accept his illegally obtained evidence so that the guilty would
not go free. It was quite another to condone a steady course of illegal
police procedures that deliberately and flagrantly violated the Constitution of the United States as well as the state constitution.
Ah, but surely the guilty should still not go free? However grave
the question, it seemed improperly directed at the exclusionary rule.
The hard answer is in the United States Constitution as well as in state
constitutions. They make it dear that the guilty would go free if the
evidence necessary to convict could only have been obtained illegally,
just as they would go free if such evidence were lacking because the
police had observed the constitutional restraints upon them. It is seriously misleading, however, to suggest that wholesale release of the
guilty is a consequence of the exclusionary rule. It is a large assumption that the police have invariably exhausted the possibilities of obtaining evidence legally when they have relied upon illegally obtained
evidence. It is more rational to assume the opposite when the offer of
illegally obtained evidence becomes routine.
It was the cumulative effect of such routine that led us at last in
the case of People v. Cahan to reject illegally obtained evidence. It
had become all too obvious that unconstitutional police methods of obtaining evidence were not being deterred in any other way. We
summed up the sorry experience that led us to conclude that the exclusionary rule was now imperative:
We have been compelled to reach that conclusion because other remedies
have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional provisions
on the part of police officers with the attendant result that the courts under
the old rule have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect
7
condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers.
The Cahan decision had one immediate salutary effect. Public
ignorance and indifference now gave way to lively public discussion on
the problem of what constitutes lawful police conduct. The realization
struck many for the first time that the conduct of police in searches,
seizures, arrests, and investigations could be crucially relevant in criminal prosecutions. In the midst of partisan hues and cries more than
'People v. Calian, 44

Cl 2d 434,5, 282 P.2d 9o,

9xi-12 (1955).
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one thoughtful observer came to realize how passive the average lawabiding citizen must have been and how emotional he had now become
about constitutional guarantees that concern him as significantly as they
concern the most sordid criminal.
Our court had not long to wait for the test cases that would compel
clarification of the exclusionary rule. At the same time they would
sound out whether the rule, set up as a deterrent to lawless police action,
was proving itself a realistic influence without facilitating the exoneration of crime. Some hundred cases arrived in the wake of Cakan. Now
that we look back on them with perspective, we find them a reasonably
orderly constellation. Unquestionably the police now have a dearer
idea than before of the restraints upon them. At the same time they
are bound to have a dearer idea of the large authority they may still
invoke in law enforcement." It is significant that in the seven-year
period of the exclusionary rule in California, marked by long overdue
clarification of standards of reasonableness in law enforcement, there
has been substantial abatement of the fear that the rule would frustrate
law enforcement. It has become increasingly dear that acceleration of
crime in our state, as in others, cannot be explained by simplistic reference to the presence or absence of the exclusionary rule.
By 1961, roughly half of the states had adopted the exclusionary
rule, with local variations. There was no uniformity of interpretation,
however, and less than consistency in either the federal or state gloss of
the rule. There emanated from the federal cases a sensitivity to federalstate relations that goes far to explain the willingness of the United
States Supreme Court to afford the states ample time and latitude to
determine how to enforce the right it had announced in Wolf v. Colorado" in 1949. However guarded the Court was about state remedies,
it left no doubt that the right was of constitutional dimension, for
Security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police-which is at
the core of the Fourth Amendment-is basic to a free society. It is therefore
implicit in "the concept of ordered liberty"10and as such enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause.
' See Draper, The Cahan Case and Probable Cause, 34 CALIF. ST. B.J.

51 (959)

Two Years with the Cahan Rule, STAN. L. REV. 515 (1957) i Comment, The Cahan

Case: The Exclusionary Rule, and the Law of Search, Seizure, and Arrest in California,
3 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 55 0955).
9 338 U.S. 25 (1949); see Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1956).
so 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949).
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. It was quickly apparent that this otherwise eloquent declaration
went limp on the key word enforceable. In many states there had not
yet loomed any effective remedies to attend the right that loomed so
large. Wearing its rich constitutional cloak, it went begging for recognition. Alone of the princely rights it often went begging in vain. It
became a classic right without a remedy. In California six years elapsed
between Wolf v. Colorado and People v. Cahan, and all during that
time we were painfully aware of the right begging in our midst. We
remained mindful of the cogent reasons for the admission of illegally
obtained evidence and clung to the fragile hope that the very brazenness of lawless police methods would bring on effective deterrents other
than the exclusionary rule. Accordingly we were proceeding with caution before responding to the message in Wolf v. Colorado, to the long
and short of the handwriting on the distant wall. We needed no more
than Ir'ine v. California1 to read the handwriting on our own wall.
In the interim between Irvine v. California and People v. Cahan it
became all too dear in our state that there was no recourse but to the
exclusionary rule. In the interim between Irvine v. California and
Mapp v. Ohio a like reflection of nation-wide import must also have
been developing in the Supreme Court of the United States. Its decision in Irvine had intimated a hope that in time the many states still
uncommitted to the exclusionary rule would reconsider their evidentiary
rules in the light of the Wolf doctrine that the fourth amendment is
enforceable against the states through the fourteenth. The indifferent
response must have been disheartening to a Court that had expressed
its reluctance to invoke federal power to upset state convictions based on
unconstitutionally obtained evidence.
The many states that failed even to re-examine their evidentiary
rules merely postponed the day of reckoning. They had clear warning
in Irvine that if they defaulted and there were no demonstrably effective deterrents to unreasonable searches and seizures in lieu of the
exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court might yet decide that they had
not complied with "minimal standards" of due process.12 When in
1961 it so decided in Mapp v. Ohio and made the exclusionary rule
mandatory in all states, it could hardly have taken anyone by surprise.
For all their distracting, discordantly nay-saying chimes, the hours had
been successively striking that the zero hour was coming.
347 U.S. 128 (1954).
1

'Wolf v.Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,

31

(1949).
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It may be helpful at this juncture to speculate why it was so long
in coming, so that we can anticipate the problems ahead. Mapp amplified the Wolf declaration that the fourteenth amendment incorporated
the core of the fourth, the constitutional right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures; henceforth that right would be interpreted as attended by the exclusionary rule in state as well as in federal
courts. It is not enough to say, however, that Mapp thus simply
extended one more constitutional standard of due process to state courts,
comparable to others that transcend the orthodox requirements of a
fair trial. The intriguing question is why this standard came so much
later than the others, when so vital a constitutional right was in issue.
The Supreme Court had long since moved to protect rights of no
greater importance. Notably, it had long since compelled the exclusion
of involuntary confessions.1" The constant basis for exclusion proved to
be other than untrustworthiness of confessions resulting from coercion,
however crude or subtle; 14 such confessions could at times be highly
trustworthy. The constant basis for exclusion proved to be other than
the prejudicial effect of coerced' confessions; there was at times other incriminating evidence so overwhelming as to rule out any probability
that the admission of the confession contributed to the conviction.15
There remains a constant basis for exclusion in the demonstrated necessity of deterring invasions of a constitutional right, undeterred by lesser
means, with a remedy of constitutional magnitude.16 Such a basis appears equally rational whether one envisages the constitutional invasion
as beginning with the extraction of the confession 7 or with the use of
the confession at the trial.'8

" Brown

v. Mississippi, 297 U.S.

278

(1936).

"'Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 540-41 (1961); Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S.
49, 50 (1949).
"5See Rogers v. Richmond, supra note x4.;
Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. IS, 18990 (x952); Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 4o, 404. (x945). Query whether the
admission of unconstitutionally seized evidence is necessarily prejudicial. See Zap v.
United States, 328 U.S. 624, 630 (1946) ; People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 59 o , 598,
290 P.2d 505, 511 (955).
"See People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 441-42, 28z P.2d 905, 910 (1955).
"Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 101 (x95).
" The dissent in Mapp takes the view instead that the basis for exclusion of involuntary confessions is not the deterrence of lawless police action but a concept of fair trial
encompassing the right to such exclusion and hence that such exclusion is a constitutional

mandate. Accepting the view that the basis for the exclusion of evidence obtained by
unreasonable search or seizure is the deterrence of lawless police action, it does not
recognize such exclusion as a constitutional mandate. The failure to envisage the two
situations as analogous may be attributable first to the large assumption that fair trial
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There are strong parallels between the unconstitutionally obtained
evidence of involuntary confessions and the unconstitutionally obtained
evidence of unreasonable searches and seizures. The more one reflects
on how serious a turn either sort of unconstitutional invasion can take,
the more superficial it seems to view the first as the more heinous.
There is no scale of decorum according to setting in the rampages of
the lawless. So much at last Mapp recognized, when it invoked as a
constant basis for its newly stated exclusionary rule the demonstrated
necessity of thus deterring invasions of a constitutional right, just as it
had in the confession cases.
The lag in recognizing the kinship between involuntary confessions
and unreasonable searches and seizures may be explained by the relatively small strain on federal-state relations in local law enforcement.
tively limited volume of cases involving the first, and hence their relaAccordingly, rules have developed of reasonable consistency and of
nation-wide application to govern the exclusion of involuntary confessions. In contrast, the problem of what constitutes unreasonable search
and seizure is omnipresent and of endless variety. It encompasses police
conduct in every stage of police activity from investigation through
arrest up to trial and in every kind of situation from the safe and commonplace to the dangerous and extraordinary. It is the problem of
government personified, wearing a badge of authority, reaching all
sorts of people where they live. It is the problem of protecting the
law-abiding from the lawless and even the lawless from one another.
Most important of all, it is the problem of protecting the law-abiding
and even the lawless from excesses of official power. And as always in
the law it is a problem of degree, of what is reasonable or unreasonable
under all the circumstances.
So polymorphous a problem was bound to present unusual risks to
federal-state relations. Strains might ensue from shortsighted or
clumsy solutions. Nevertheless there is cause to regret the long lapse
between Wolf v. Colorado and Mapp v. Ohio during which the federal

exclusionary rule went its meandering way, more state exclusionary rules
sprang up and went their meandering ways as did pre-existing ones,
requires exclusion of involuntary confessions however trustworthy or free of prejudicial
effect, by relation back to lawless police action, and then to a failure to maintain the
same standard of fair trial and make the same relation back as to evidence obtained
from an unreasonable search and seizure. The import of such reasoning is plain. Law-

less police action in extracting involuntary confessions, even though it may involve no
more than skillful psychiatric questioning, is bad; but lawless police action in searches
and seizures, however unrestrained, is not so bad. 367 U.S. at 672-86.
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and a loyal opposition of states continued to admit the evidence, and no
questions asked.
For more than a decade, Wolf's right without a remedy frustrated
the possibilities of litigation in the Supreme Court that could have given
more than spectral illumination of the right. In consequence no case
law developed at the highest level to yield guiding standards for determining what searches and seizures would be subject to condemnation
under the fourteenth amendment. The most we learned was to be
newly skeptical of the old adage that half a wolf is better than none.
Even in states most jealous of their prerogatives, most on guard
against federal interference, the growing overlap of state and federal
police problems must have brought home the inevitability of a constitutional remedy to complement the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures. There was increasing restiveness over
the uncertainties engendered by the lack of a nationwide exclusionary
rule.
Any state that adopted its own exclusionary rule soon learned that
the day-to-day responsibility of policing the police involves close and
continual examination of local police practices in the context of local
community problems and local statutes. In the main such a responsibility can hardly be shifted from state courts conversant with the local
scene to the United States Supreme Court, particularly since the latter
would be in no position to take on so onerous a burden.
By way of conveying what such a burden would be, I need only
refer to what it has been in my own state and, with adjustments for local
variations, you can multiply it by fifty. In California alone hundreds
of search and seizure cases have come before the appellate courts since
the state adopted the exclusionary rule in 1955, and they have compelled detailed articulation of what is reasonable and what is unreasonable. The procession of cases continues, though in diminishing force,
just as the procession continues in any other field of the law where the
issue of reasonableness turns on a novel combination of facts. There is
little chance that the United States Supreme Court would be willing and
able to receive fifty such processions marching through its doors, calling
upon it to give the details that make up the rules that govern the officials
who search and seize.
The Court may well decide to leave to the state courts substantial
latitude in the development of local rules. Local problems of law
enforcement are of a quite different order from federal problems. From
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petty crime to- major crime, they present many more unpredictable
variations. They include many more situations of what might be called
garden varieties of civil disobedience. They are problems much more
likely to call for emergency action. They are also much more likely
to have direct impact on the community. They are more likely to
present the dilemma that compels balancing the very present evil of
freeing the guilty against the evil threat that condonation of lawless
police action bodes for the right to privacy of the law-abiding.
The state courts are well situated to develop local precedents flexible
enough to allow for the innocuousness of an occasional unwitting technical infraction, flexible enough to take account of the cumulatively evil
effect of deliberate infractions, flexible enough to serve in a variety of
situations from routine inspections to police emergencies. It is reasonable to assume that there will be -appropriate local rules even though
they may not be symmetric with the federal ones. To displace them
mechanically would be to invite impairment of federal-state relations to
little purpose. Local rules can serve well as an immediate deterrent
to lawless action. They will have constitutional sanction, for whatever
action is illegal is perforce unreasonable. From whichever way one
looks at the problem, from the city hall to the nation's capital, it thus
seems reasonable to suppose that it will lie with the state courts to take
the initiative in giving meaning to Mapp.
Nevertheless the United States Supreme Court still confronts a
special new responsibility of its own. Sooner or later it must establish
ground rules of unreasonableness to counter whatever local pressures
there might be to spare the evidence that would spoil the exclusionary
rule. Its responsibility thus to exercise a restraining influence looms as
a heavy one. It is no mean task to formulate farsighted constitutional
standards of what is unreasonable that lend themselves readily to
nation-wide application.
Such basic minimum standards will operate to deter unreasonable
searches and seizures and to bar legislation that would sanction the
admission of evidence obtained therefrom.19 Every state would respect
a decision that condemned specific conduct as unreasonable and hence
outside constitutional bounds. It is this significant much, and no more,
that Mr. Justice Clark's majority opinion in Mapp appears to connote.
He anticipates that 'Federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime
"See MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 5 (x957); MICH. CONST. art. II, § xo (1908)
amended in 1936 and x955 S.D. CODE § 1102 (935).

as
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under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of
their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in
their approaches. 2 0
The preoccupation is with federal-state harmony on fundamentals,
with uniformity on what is unreasonable under the fourth amendment
now that it is encompassed in the fourteenth. There is no suggestion
that the highest court would go beyond the responsibility it now has to
formulate standards of what is unreasonable. There is no suggestion
that it would articulate for the states the countless details of what is
reasonable. Nor is there any suggestion that it would demand from
the states a martinet uniformity of rules within the zone of reasonableness. To borrow in this context the words of Mr. Justice Clark: "There
21
is no war between the Constitution and common sense."
Even were they a well-developed nucleus, federal rules differentiating the unreasonable from the reasonable in the searches and seizures
of federal officials might prove inappropriate on the local scene. It
would be all the more inappropriate to apply indiscriminately to the
local scene the present confusing federal rules, many of which are
underdeveloped or over-refined. It is idle to seek in the conglomeration
a pattern of consistent interpretation of the fourth amendment. It is
not just that the cases are conflicting. They are turbid with the wash of
the fourth amendment itself, of statutes specifying the authority of
federal officers, 22 of local statutes governing their authority to arrest,2
of the Supreme Court's monitorship of the federal administration of
criminal justice.24 Who can tell with certainty why a search or seizure
was held unreasonable? Who knows whether it was deemed in violation
of the Constitution or of lesser law or of both? Where is the lead that
state courts can follow?
However obscure the bases on which they rest, federal rules have
been declared applicable to the conduct of state officers in obtaining
evidence that they have made available for federal prosecutions. 25 This
extension of the federal rules has met with forceful criticism. 26 Perhaps
" Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658 (196i).
23 "d.at 657.

See Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth

Amendment, supra note 2, at 7o5-o6 n.zt6.

United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 58x, 589 (1948).
R. CRIM. P. 3,4, z6, 41; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3406-452 (App.
21 Elkins v. United States, 364-U.S. 2o6, 224 (xg6o).
2S

21 FED.

1958).

" See dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Elkins v. United States, supra
note 25, at 245; Grant, supra note 2, at 20, 43.
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there will be no automatic extension of all federal rules to state prosecutions in the wake of Mapp. There is no substitute for close evaluation
of the local context to determine what is unreasonable. It is idle to
suppose that reference to existing federal rules would do the trick.
There is more to the trick than routine incantation and more to the rules
than deserve application.
Take for example the federal rule that attaches puzzling status
symbols of admissibility to evidence obtained in the course of a legal
2
search and seizure either under a warrant or incident to a valid arrest. T
The evidence is admissible if it is contraband, not simply because of its
evidentiary value but apparently also because the defendant has no
right to own it.2 The evidence is admissible if it is stolen goods, not
simply because of its evidentiary value but apparently also because the
defendant is not the rightful owner. One might begin to think that
admissibility is controlled by property concepts, but at this juncture night
falls. The evidence is also admissible when the defendant has the right
to own it and is the rightful owner, not simply because of its evidentiary
value but also because it was an instrument or a fruit of the wrongdoing2 9 or a record that the defendant was required by law to keep.30
Thus several tails wag in the dog of evidentiary value.
Dog it is when it has no tail, for the cases declare that the evidence
is not admissible when it is of "evidentiary value only." This ground
for excluding the evidence comes as something of a shock. There are
explanations in the dark that the ratio decidendi flows somehow from
the fourth amendment to render the erstwhile legal search and seizure
illegal and also from the fifth amendment to render the evidence
inadmissible, even though there was no compulsion on the defendant to
produce it and hence no implied admission on his part that could be
interpreted as self-incrimination."' The plot has only begun to thicken.
The real thick of the thing is in the disputation as to what is "evidentiary
"Gouled v. United States, z55 U.S. 298, 310 (i921); see Abel v. United States,
362 U.S. 217, 234-35 (t96o).
"Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 1452 154-55 (-947).
0'Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 238 (196o); Marron v. United States, 275
U.S.

92) 199 (1927).

"eZapv. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1946) ; Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582, 593 (1946).
a' See MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE OF GUILT 23 (x959); Meltzer, Required Records, The

McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, iS U. Ci. L. REV. 687,
700 (195); Comment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on The
Fourth Amendment, supra note 2, at 695-96.
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value only." Does the evidence have the vulgar status of "evidentiary
value only" or has it been sublimated by additives or does it qualify as
a specialty such as a fruit? The apple and the arrow may be admissible,
and also the bow; but the quiver, is it no more than an only?
Should any state court in its right mind risk losing it in the pursuit
of learning whatever the total message is of a federal rule of such
elaborate obfuscation? Is it not possible to undertake orderly development of local2 rules consistent with both common sense and the
3
Constitution?
In my state the penal code provides that a search warrant may issue
for the search and seizure of any evidence "which tends to show a
felony has been committed, or tends to show that a particular person
has committed a felony. '33 The statute in effect rejects the federal
rule barring search for evidence "of evidentiary value only." It nevertheless seems well within the Constitution, given the preliminary requisite of probable cause for making the search. Even apart from the
statute, it might well be consistent with the Constitution to make a
comparable search incident to a valid arrest, subject of course to whatever conditions might be necessary to guard against unreasonableness.
Suppose for example that there falls on the ears of police a cry of "Don't
shoot!" and then what sounds like a shot, then the fall of a body. The
police enter the suspected house and find a corpse with a bullet wound.
They search for and find the gun. The circumstances make it reasonable for them to continue their search, regardless of whether it is icidental to the arrest of the eventual defendant or whether he has already
made his escape. Surely there would be no constitutional condition
that they could seize only the gun that was the instrument of the crime
and that they must keep their distance from other evidence that would
be "of evidentiary value only" on matters of such high relevance as
motive, premeditation, provocation, self-defense, or the identity of the
killer.
If states are given freedom from entangling alliances with confusing
federal rules that have no clear constitutional basis, their responsibility
is the greater to look to the Constitution in the development of their
local rules. Only by so doing can they dissipate prevalent misgivings
that the exclusionary rule cannot live up to its purpose in view of the
pressures to circumvent it by way of make-believe that excessive searches
"See

Comment, Limitations on Seizure of "Evidewiary" Objects: A Rule in Search

of a Reason, 2o U. Cm. L. REv. 319 (1953).
" CAL. PE.

CoDE § 1524(4).
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and seizures are reasonable. 4 It should be possible to develop .with
clarity as well as constitutional nicety rules that will operate realistically
without frustrating either the exclusionary rule or law enforcement.
Mapp v. Ohio provides an opportune occasion to take stock of present
inconsistencies in the law of search and seizure the better to understand
just what it is that the amendment protects.
Eloquent declarations of the past have condemned unreasonable
searches and seizures as invasions of the four walls that constitute a
man's castle. However dearly such declarations have sounded the
fourth amendment's concern with a man's right to privacy, their emphasis on the castle has not merely restricted the right to property
connotations but has deadened inquiry into what constitutes the right
in a modern context. The emphasis on the castle has taken some
strangely literal turns. The unwelcome king could not literally insinuate himself or a mechanical extension of himself through the door
or the window or any other opening. 5 He was free to post himself
anywhere outside, however, and to receive the evidence that came
through all too thin walls, with mechanical eyes and ears as well as his
own. 6 As a trespasser the king stood condemned, but as an eavesdropper he was tolerated, however unwelcome his intrusion within radius
of the eaves. 7
There has been no lack of signs that the right to privacy transcends
property connotations and that even in a property sense it needs redefinition. For lack of live reinterpretation, however, confusion in the
application of the fourth amendment has mounted so greatly that it
has more than once been despairingly noted in divergent opinions
emanating from the Supreme Court itself.
a' See Barrett, supra note z, at 54-55, 66; Kamisar, Illegal Searches or Seizures and
Contemporaneous Incriminating Statements: A Dialogue on a Neglected Area of. Criminal Procedure, 1961 U. ILL. L.F. 78, 118; Reynard, Freedom From Unreasonable
Search and Seizure-AI Second Class Constitutional Right?, 25 IND. L.J. 259, 31z
(195o); Way, Increasing Scope of Search Incidental to Arrest, 1959 WASH. U.L.Q.
26t, 275, 277.

Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 12S, 132 (1954).
Goldman v.United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942); Olmstead v.United States, z77
U.S. 438 (1928). See DASH,THE EAVESDROPPERS (x959).
"T The distinction may be doomed by Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512
(596x) :"[D]ec.sion here does not turn upon the technicality of a trespass upon a party
'

wall as a matter of local law. Itisbased upon the reality of an actual intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area," The court added guardedly, "We find no occasion to
by even a fraction of.an inch."
re-examine Goldman here, but we decline to go beyond it,

Ibid.
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Confusion enough has resulted from over-refined preoccupation with
trespass to property instead of with invasion of the right to privacy
itself. There has been still more muddle in the law of search and
seizure as a result of the underdeveloped correlation between searches
and seizures under a warrant not incident to a valid arrest and searches
and seizures without a warrant incident to a valid arrest. 8 In the latter
situation the police are not required to call upon a magistrate in advance
for a judicial determination of probable cause. Once they have made
an arrest and obtained the evidence, their very success may serve as a
retroactive makeweight for probable cause and thus tilt the scales for
a judicial finding of such cause. Moreover, searches and seizures without a warrant, though always subject to the requirement of reasonableness, are not under the constraint of specifications "particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized."
We can better appreciate the need for correlation once we perceive that
a limited search and seizure under a warrant may culminate in a valid
arrest and that further search and seizure beyond the warrant specifications may then be legitimated as incident to the valid arrest.3 9 In
other words, the police may have a shorter reach if they are armed
with a warrant than if they are not. Understandably they may prefer
to go unarmed.
So patent a discrepancy suggests how great is the need for a review
of warrant requirements to determine whether they are unrealistically
rigid in relation to the alternative of warrantless searches and seizures.
Such a review would logically entail a converse inquiry, whether the
sanctions of warrantless searches and seizures incident to a valid arrest
are unduly lax.
Searching inquiry might also reveal a need for correlation of alternatives beyond these two. It might be possible, for example, to lessen
the risk of arrest without probable cause by giving the police dear
authorization to stop persons for restrained questioning whenever there
Compare Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 61o (196i) and Jones v. United
C
States, 357 U.S. 493 (1958) and Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957) and
Jeffers v. United States, 342 U.S. 48 (i951) and McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S.
451 (1948) and Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948) and Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948) uwith Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (196o)
and Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 36o (1959) and United States v. Rabinowitz, 339
U.S. S6 (i95o).
" Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Marron v. United States, 275
U.S. 192 (1977); cf. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (931).
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were circumstances sufficient to warrant it, even though not tantamount
to probable cause for arrest. Such a minor interference with personal
liberty would touch the right to privacy only to serve it well. If
questioning failed to reveal probable cause, it would thereby forestall
invalid arrests of innocent persons on inadequate cause and the attendant
invasion of their personal liberty and reputation. 40 If it revealed probable cause, it would do no more than open the way to a valid arrest.
It would then not be possible for a guilty defendant to magnify slight
detention for questioning, based on probable cause to question, into an
arrest lacking the validity that proceeds from a higher level of probability, probable cause to arrest.
If I refer again to local examples, it is only for the advantage of
speaking from direct experience. We have had to rule in our state on
the validity of an arrest in several cases in which officers on night patrol
have observed automobiles or pedestrians in questionable situations that
arguably fell short of probable cause for arrest. We have upheld the
authority of officers not only to question but also to make a subsequent
arrest on the basis of probable cause that developed in the course of
the questioning. 41 When questioning prompts flight or obvious attempts
to conceal or dispose of something, such action in sequence of the initial
suspicious circumstances constitutes probable cause for arrest. It would
seem highly unrealistic to hold such an arrest invalid on the ground
that arrest actually coincided with the initial police questioning and that
the then suspicious circumstances fell short of probable cause for arrest.
Such technicality would invite the circumvention of building up suspicious circumstances to probable cause for arrest, and the eventual consequence might be lower standards of arrest.42 Surely there is a middle
ground between the excesses of questioning on mere suspicion and of
invalidating an arrest that followed upon questioning on suspicion reasonably generated by the immediate circumstances.
If we keep in mind that the raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule is
the deterrence of lawless law enforcement, we can guard against confusion in the attendant rules we develop. At the outset we can rule
out spurious reasons for exclusion. The objective of exclusion is cer"' See Barrett, supra note 2, at 65-66.
41People v. Duncan, 5x Cal. 2d 523, 346 P.zd 5zi (0959); People v. Blodgett,

46

Cal. 2d 114, 293 P.2d 57 (1956); People v. Martin, 46 Cal. 2d io6, 293 P.2d 5z
(1956); People v. Simon, 45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (x955); cf. Rios v. United
States, 364. U.S. 253 (196o); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Brinegar
v. United States, 338 U.S. 16o (1949).
"' See Barrett, supra note 2, at 69-70.
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tainly not to afford criminals a right to escape prosecution.

At most

the exclusionary rule will afford them a fortuitous escape when there is
no way of obtaining evidence against them constitutionally. The objective of the exclusionary rule is certainly not to compensate the defendant
for the past wrong done to him any more than it is to penalize the
officer for the past wrong he has done. The emphasis is forward.
The emphasis in our state on the deterrence of lawless law enforcement has given direction to our rules. As a result we have departed
from long-entrenched federal rules on standing to object to illegally
obtained evidence. 43 Those rules have rested on property concepts,
with an admixture of tort concepts. Standing to object has depended
on whether the defendant could show that he had a property interest
in the premises searched or the evidence seized. The exclusionary rule
ordinarily operated when such an interest existed, but otherwise failed
to operate. This limitation may well have lessened its deterrent effect.
Not until the Jones case in 196o was standing to object accorded to
"anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs." 44

Whatever advance the decision makes from orthodox concepts, it
indicates a continuing tendency to focus on a relation between the defendant and the property involved. Such a focus to ferret out some
violated right of the defendant suggests, though perhaps unintentionally, that the objective of the exclusionary rule is to make amends to
the defendant. What should be of primary concern is not the grievances of selected guilty defendants such as land-owners or the gentry
of invitees, but the grievousness of official lawlessness.
That has been the primary concern in my state since we adopted the
exclusionary rule in 1955. The defendant's standing to object does
not depend on his showing that the evidence was illegally obtained in
violation of some right of his, substantial or tenuous. He need only
show that the state obtained the evidence illegally, whether in violation
of his rights or those of third parties, which is to say that he must show
that the state obtained the evidence in the course of a search and seizure
that was unreasonable. 45
" See cases collected in Jones v. United States,
"362

362 U.S. 257, 262-66 (196o).

U.S. at 267.

"This rule focuses inquiry on the reasonableness of the officer's conduct rather than
on whose rights may have been violated. We pointed out that "if law enforcement
officers are allowed to evade the exclusionary rule by obtaining evidence in violation of
the rights of third parties, its deterrent effect is to that extent nullified. Moreover, such
a limitation virtually invites law enforcement officers to violate the rights of third par-

ties and to trade the escape of a criminal whose rights are violated for the conviction of
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A court need nt, more be misled by inappropriate concepts of tort
than of property. What matters primarily is not whether official conduct involved a tort to the defendant, but whether it was unreasonable
in the constitutional sense. Thus, suppose that an officer arrested the
defendant without probable cause and incident to the arrest made a
search that established the defendant's guilt. His guilt might deprive
him of an action for false arrest,46 but it has not obliterated the unreasonableness of the arrest. An arrest without probable cause cannot be
retroactively justified by what it turns up."
Hence even in the absence of any tort to the defendant the exclusionary rule should operate if it is to serve its purpose of deterring
unreasonable official conduct. The fortuitous absence of any tort to the
defendant should no more operate to make the evidence admissible
than should the fortuitous absence of any property interest that may
be attributable to the defendant.
The prosecution also would stand to realize some gain if we freed
the exclusionary rule from wooden association with tort and property
concepts. With those concepts in the background, the focus would be
on the reasonableness of the official conduct in the context of all the
circumstances. It might be adjudged reasonable even if it involved a
tort to the defendant or an invasion of some property interest of his.
The evidence would then be admissible because it had been obtained
without violation of the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
Suppose for example that the police respond to a telephone call
from the operator of a rooming house who asks them to come and get
narcotics that she has just discovered in her basement. They are
unaware, as she may also be, that she had no right to enter the basement, which was rented to the defendant. The prevailing local view
of privilege in the law of torts would determine whether or not the
others by the use of evidence illegally obtained against them." People v. Martin, 45
Cal. zd 755, 760, 290 P.2d 85s, 857 (1955).
'e See RESTATEMENT, To'rs § 119, comment g (1934).
"Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. zo, 16-17 (1948); United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948). To hold otherwise "would defeat the purpose of the constitutional provisions prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures and destroy the
efficacy of the exclusionary rule in many felony prosecutions. Officers would be free to
arrest and search anyone, however innocent, in the hope that the search would justify
the arrest." People v. Brown, 45 Cal. zd 640, 644, 290 P.id 528, 530 (.955). The
exclusionary rule "would fail of its purpose, if in the only area of its effective opera.
tion it could be defeated because the arresting officer guessed correctly in making an
arrest?' Id. at 644-45, 29o P.zd at 531.
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police committed a civil trespass when they entered the basement and
seized the narcotics. Once it is determined that their conduct is not
unreasonable in the circumstances, it is not rendered unreasonable in
the event that it is deemed to have involved a civil trespass. We have
said as much in a California case.48
We turn now to questions of procedure. Here too it seems timely
to note that federal rules should not necessarily be controlling in state
courts, since there may be alternatives of equal or superior merit in
the local context. In my state we have departed in the main from the
federal rule that the defendant who challenges the admissibility of the
evidence must ordinarily do so before trial, via a special motion to
suppress 9 In one situation our procedure is analogous. If the defendant fails before trial to challenge a search warrant valid on its face,
in accord with prescribed statutory procedure, he cannot challenge it
at the trial." Apart from this special situation, however, we view a
challenge to evidence allegedly resulting from unreasonable search or
seizure as we normally view other challenges to admissibility.5 1
The defendant "makes a prima fade case when he establishes that
an arrest was made without a warrant or that private premises were
entered or a search made without a search warrant, and the burden
then rests on the prosecution to show proper justification. ' 52 For the
purpose of determining whether the defendant should stand trial, the
prosecution may meet this burden by producing evidence to show that
" "In this proceeding we are not concerned with enforcing defendant's rights under
the law of trespass and landlord and tenant, but with discouraging unreasonable activity
on the part of law enforcement officers. 'A criminal prosecution is more than a game
in which the Government may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its
officers have not played according to rule.' (Mr. Justice Stone in McGuire v. United
States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 [47 S.Ct. 259, 71 L.Ed. 556]), and when as in this case the
officers have acted in good faith with the consent and at the request of a home owner
in conducting a search, evidence so obtained cannot be excluded merely because the
officers may have made a reasonable mistake as to the extent of the owner's authority."
People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. 2d 776, 783, 291 P.zd 469, 473 (1955). Compare Chapman
v. United States, 365 U.S. 6xo (196i); People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. zd 374, 377, 303
P.2d 721, 722 (1956).

" See cases collected in People v. Berger, 44 Cal. zd 459, 462-64, 282 P.zd 5o9,
510-12 (1955).
See People v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d 714, 719-20, 361 P.2d 587, 589-90 (1961).
'1 People v. Berger, 44 Cal. 2d 459, 464, 282 P.2d 509, 512 (1955). Of course,
if the prosecution is by information rather than indictment the defendant may be able
to establish at the preliminary hearing that the prosecution rests entirely on such evidence and thus secure a dismissal forthwith. When the prosecution is by indictment,
however, he has no way of challenging the evidence while it is before the grand jury.
" Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, 272, 294. P.2d 23, 25 (1956).
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the police had reasonable cause to make an arrest and search without
a warrant or that their action was otherwise justified. When the issue
is raised at the trial itself, both sides may present evidence bearing on
the legality of the police action. On the basis of all of the evidence the
trial court must determine whether the challenged evidence resulted
from unreasonable search or seizure. As with the usual challenge to the
admissibility of evidence, the decision is made by the trial judge. The
decision is subject to review on appeal, but it will stand if it is supported
by substantial evidence.
Once the trial judge has ruled on admissibility he does not in our
state open the door to reconsideration of that issue by the jury. There
is no parallel with the special procedure in many states, including
California, regarding involuntary confessions whereby the trial court
may initially admit the confession and then instruct the jury to disregard it if they find it was not voluntary.53
We come now to a duster of problems on the retroactive application of the Mapp case. The reversal of defendant's conviction in that
case, itself a retroactive application of the newly announced exclusionary
rule, is in keeping with the usual practice when there is nothing to indicate that retroactivity would entail undue hardship on those who may
have relied on law now displaced. They cannot plead reasonable
reliance, let alone hardship, who may have relied on the now displaced
law in violating the Constitution.
The retroactive application of Mapp confirms the similar application
we made of the exclusionary rule when we established it in California.
If experience is at least one of the best teachers, it may be helpful to
draw on it for the cases subsequent to the adoption of our rule to
illustrate how various can be the problems that attend retroactivity.
There were appeals in which the record did not dearly establish
that the search or seizure was unreasonable. Even if it might appear
so on the face of the record, there was always the possibility that the
"The rule of the confession cases is justified by the fact that the jury must necessarily be informed of the circumstances surrounding the confession properly to evaluate
it. The probative value of evidence obtained by search or seizure, however, does not
depend on whether the search was legal or illegal, and no purpose would be served by
having the jury make a second determination of that issue. Moreover, the legality of a
search or seizure will frequently depend on whether the officer had reasonable cause to
make an arrest, and since such cause is not limited to evidence that would be admissible
at the trial on the issue of guilt . . . , evidence that was otherwise inadmissible and
prejudicial would frequently be presented to them if the jury were required to pass on
the legality of the search or seizure." People v. Gorg, 45 Cal. ad 776, 781, 291 P.2d
469, 472 (955).
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prosecution could have justified it as reasonable, but regarded it as
unnecessary to do so when there was no bar to the admission of the
evidence in any event under existing law. For the same reason defense
counsel might well have deemed it useless to object to the admission
of the evidence or to lay a foundation for its exclusion. Since we have
no procedure for taking additional evidence on appeal in criminal cases
we had to decide such cases on the records before us. There was a risk
of penalizing defendants for failing to take steps to exclude the evidence.
There was also a risk of undoing a legitimate conviction merely on the
contention of the defendant that the evidence admitted had ensued from
an unreasonable search or seizure. We found a middle ground for
decision. The defendant could raise the issue of admissibility for the
first time on appeal, if his case had been tried before adoption of the
exclusionary rule and if there was substantial evidence in the record of
unreasonable search or seizure.5" If the record was silent on the question, we presumed that the police acted reasonably.es
There were other problems of retroactivity. What of the situation
where the judgment of conviction had become final before the adoption
of the exclusionary rule? We found guidance in the reasoning of the
Cahan case that the exclusionary rule was no more than a judicially
created rule of evidence. Accordingly such a judgment was not subject
to collateral attack.
In such manner we weathered the period of adjustment that follows
any overthrow of a familiar rule of law. By i96i, six years after we
deposed our traditional rule, we were in some measure prepared for
the advent of Mapp v. Ohio. Still, it has given our local revolution a
new twist. The exclusionary rule of 1961 that now binds all the states
is no mere rule of evidence, but part and parcel of the Constitution. It
took time to deliver it to its destiny, but there is no longer any question
that it has arrived. The great question now is how the fifty states will
pay it their respects in view of the Supreme Court's affirmation in Mapp,
accompanying the overruling of Wolf, that the long-standing federal
exclusionary rule has been constitutionally required since its recognition
in Weeks v. United States.5 6
Specifically, are final judgments of conviction in state courts open
to collateral attack now that the use of unconstitutionally obtained evidence at trial amounts to a violation of the Constitution? At least one
People v. Kitchens, 46 Cal. 2d z6o, 262-63, 294 P.2d 17, 19 (xt96).
"People v. Ferrara, 46 Cal. 2d 265, 268-69, 294 P.2d 21, 23 (x956).
"232 U.S. 383 (19-4).
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thing is dear, in state and federal courts alike. Whatever the possibilities that judgments of conviction can continue to withstand collateral
attack, they can no longer do so on the ground that the use of the
challenged evidence violates no more than a rule of evidence.
Are there alternatives? The question is suggested by a significant
footnote in the majority opinion in Mapp: "As is always the case, however, state procedural requirements governing assertion and pursuance
of direct and collateral constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions
must be respected ....,,5
In California courts, as in the federal courts, final judgments of
conviction may be collaterally attacked by habeas corpus or other postconviction procedures if they have ensued from violations of certain
constitutional rights, provided of course that ordinary remedies have
been exhausted, were not available, or were excusably lost."8 We find
in the pertinent cases strong reasons to justify so drastic a remedy as
collateral attack to vindicate the particular constitutional rights involved.
It would be superficial to assume, however, that invariably there are
such reasons. I have come to the view, set forth in a recent concurring
opinion,59 that there are no such reasons to justify collateral attack as
a method of vindicating a defendant's now-recognized constitutional
right to the exclusion of evidence against him resulting from an unreasonable search or seizure.
The most telling reason for collateral attack on judgments of conviction is that it operates to eliminate the risk of convicting the innocent.
Such a risk attends any conviction ensuing from the witting use of
perjured testimony, 0 the suppression of evidence, 6 an involuntary confession,62 the denial of an opportunity to present a defense, 3 and the
"Mapp
"Waley

v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 n.9 (1961).
v. Johnston, 3z6 U.S.

(x939); Johnson v. Zerbst,

304

1x

(1942); Bowen v. Johnston, 3o6 U.S.

19

U.S. 458 (1938); In re Dixon, 41 Cal. zd 756, 264

P.zd 513 (1953).
"In re Harris, 56 Cal. 2d 898, 899, 366 P.2d 305, 306 (1961).
"Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S.

103

(193s).
"People v. Carter, 48 Cal.
"See Lyons v. Oklahoma,
§§

822-56

"See

2d 737, 747, 312 P.2d 665, 671 (1957).
322 U.S. 596, 605 (1944); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDECE

( 3 d ed. 1940).
concurring opinions of Justice Frankfurter (361 U.S. x6o, 167) and Justice

Harlan (36!

U.S. x69, 172)

in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959)s In re

Harris, 56 Cal. ad 898, 899, 366 P.2d 305, 306 (ig6x) i cf., Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S.
174, 181-82 (x947) where collateral attack was denied on the ground that the remedy
by appeal had not been exhausted. See also Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428-29
(196z).
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denial of the right to counsel." A comparable risk arises-upon a failure
to provide an indigent defendant with a trial transcript necessary to
perfect his appeal. 65
The most telling distinction of a defendant convicted on evidence
resulting from an unreasonable search or seizure is that he is dearly
guilty. It is not the purpose of the exclusionary rule to protect the
guilty. Its purpose of deterring lawless law enforcement will be amply
served in any state from now on by affording defendants an orderly
procedure for challenging the admissibility of the evidence at or before
trial and on appeal.
Deterrence would be served but little more and at exorbitant cost
by affording the weapon of collateral attack to those defendants who
were convicted before the adoption of any exclusionary rule and hence
had no way of challenging the admissibility of the evidence. To begin
with, their cases are history, and they should not now be given the
power to rewrite it. To place at the disposition of the guilty an extraordinary remedy designed to insure the protection of the innocent would
be to invite needless disruption in the administration of justice. There
is a world of difference between a timely objection to evidence on the
basis of the exclusionary rule and the uprooting of final judgments.
Consider the opportunities for collateral attack that would open up
whenever the Supreme Court extended the scope of the exclusionary
rule. Consider what untoward use of collateral attack there might be,
for example, in the wake of the recent expansion of the exclusionary
rule to bar in federal trials evidence resulting from unreasonable searches
and seizures by state officers. Or consider a like sequence to the recent
liberalization of the rules on standing to challenge the evidence. There
might well be a quarrel between the Constitution and common sense if
each such change served to invite fresh attacks on final judgments.
Every judgment would be vulnerable that had been affirmed on appeal
under the pre-existing rule.
It is not without significance that before the advent of Mapp the
lower federal courts consistently held that the issue of admissibility
cannot be revived by collateral attack."8 There is all the more reason
"Powell

v. Alabama, 287 U.s. 45 (93z)-

"Eskridge v. Washington, 357 U.S.

214

(958);

Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S.

12

(1956).
"United States v. Zavada, 291 F.2d 189, x91 (6th Cir. x961); Alexander v.
United States, 290 F.2d 252, 254. (sth Cir. x961); Jones vi Attorney General of the
United States, 278 F.2d 699, 701 (8th Cir. x96o ) ; Plummer v. United States, 26o
F.2d 729, 730 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Wilkins v. United States, 258 F.2d 416 (D.C.
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for such a view since Mapp. Common sense reminds us that expansions
of the exclusionary rule should not serve to revive an issue of admissibility that has no bearing on the issue of guilt. There is no comparable
reopening available to the prosecution in the event of contractions, given
the rules against double jeopardy.
The more one reflects on the questions posed by Mapp v. Ohio, the
more ramifications they present. This inquiry has been no more than
a partial reconnaissance by one who has been over similar ground in
his own jurisdiction and can bring that experience to the task for whatever it is worth. The reflections I have set forth cover only a few of
the possible questions. They may nevertheless serve to suggest that
state courts be wary of a mechanical acceptance of federal rules, and at
the same time that they be alert to fulfill their own responsibilities for
constructive development of the exclusionary rule. Such development
would be in keeping with the symbiotic relation between the federal
government and the states.
We leave stil unanswered some of the large questions posed at the
outset. We have still to construct adequate definitions as to what
constitutes lawful arrest or reasonable search incident to an arrest. We
have still to clarify what it is that makes a search or seizure unreasonable. We have a job of correlation to do between arrest or search with
a warrant and arrest or search without. We have yet to settle the relations between the fourth amendment and the fifth within the context of
the fourteenth. Even if outer space permitted, there is no time here
for questions of such magnitude.
Nor can we fathom in one easy lesson the significance of the fourth
amendment beyond the realm of the police. It may be of the greatest
relevance in non-criminal cases involving civil regulation. 7 It may be
of the greatest relevance in the growing domain of military regulation.
But those are two other stories, and they would be long in the telling.
One reflection remains, however, by way of a postscript to the text,
as to the public response to fourth amendment problems that the exclusionary rule arouses. We must be prepared for ill-informed and emotional debate. Lawyers can do much to dear the air of baseless fears
Cir. 1958); United States v. Scales, 249 F.zd 368, 370 ( 7 th Cir. 1957); Barber v.
United States, 197 F.2d 8z5 (toth Cir. 195);
Fowler v. Hunter, z64 F.2d 669, 66970 (xoth Cir. 1947); Fowler v. Gill, x56 F.2d 565, 566 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Graham
v. Squier, 132 F.2d 68r, 684-85 ( 9 th Cir. 1942);
Price v. Johnston, 125 F.zd 8o6,
8zr ( 9 th Cir. 1942); Taylor v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 825, 826 (OothCir. 1940).
" See Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263 (296o); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360 (1959).
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and to inform the public of the real problems awaiting solution. They
can enlist support for the recruitment and retention of police well
qualified for the many heavy responsibilities of law enforcement. They
can bring home to others that such enforcement calls not only for skilled
and intelligent officers of the law but also for a community of people
who themselves show respect for the law in their everyday conduct. It
is upon high police standards and community respect for the law and
its officers that effective law enforcement basically depends. Given
these, the courts will have a favorable environment for the orderly development of the exclusionary rule. Absent these, few would dare
predict the consequences of Mapp v. Ohio at large in the fifty states.

